

COMMAND EXERCISE DEBRIEF

The Willows — Multiple viewpoint effects testing

7 Oct 2026, 13:40 | VFX compositor | revision 11

OUTCOME

Review

DURATION

T+20 min

DECISIONS

2/2 supported

METHANE

Not submitted

EXERCISE SUMMARY

FIRE CONTROL MOBILISING MESSAGE

Fire Control mobilising. Building fire — well alight, making up. Location: Brackla, Bridgend. Caller reports: well alight, flames showing; persons reported. 4 pumps and an aerial ladder platform mobilised. You are responding — take command on arrival.

Flashover with BA crews committed — a safety-critical failure.

2 of 2 simulator-judged decisions were supported by the recorded conditions.

Safety event: Flashover with BA crews committed at T+20

DEBRIEF

The incident got away — but there's plenty to take forward.

WHAT WENT WELL

- Good call — monitor at T+0 ("Perform a 360 and establish a water supply").
- Good call — defensive external at T+10 ("External attack through upstairs window").
- Every judged decision (2) matched the conditions.
- Gathered information before acting: speak to witness (T+10), fire control update (T+10), consult responsible person (T+10), check ori (T+10).

WHAT TO IMPROVE

- Questionable — offensive internal at T+15 ("Leave perimeter as it is for now, establish an inner cordon and send in a BA crew to assess conditions") for the conditions at the time.
- Safety-critical — Flashover with BA crews committed (T+20).
- Flashover with BA crews committed — a safety-critical failure.
- A casualty on the first floor was never found (deceased).
- Property partially saved (damage 23).

KEY DECISION POINTS

T+00 | GOOD | monitor: "Perform a 360 and establish a water supply"

T+05 | NEUTRAL | monitor: "Send a METHANE"

T+10 | GOOD | defensive-external: "External attack through upstairs window"

T+15 | QUESTIONABLE | offensive-internal: "Leave perimeter as it is for now, establish an inner cordon and send in a BA crew to assess conditions"

LEARNING POINTS

- Incident states: Venting fire (T+0).
- Read the warning signs — sealed compartment, hot pulsing smoke, severe fire — before committing crews.
- Send an early METHANE / informative message to set the incident picture.
- With persons unaccounted for, search the fire floor first — "nobody inside" is a claim, not a fact.

DOCTRINE DEBRIEF (NOT AN ASSESSMENT)

Incident Commander | Command level 1

SFJ Awards Level 3 Award in Initial Incident Command in Fire and Rescue Services | Ofqual 610/0183/1 | Unit 1 (6033) | 65h TQT

Doctrine score 54/100 - UNSATISFACTORY

Safety-critical event: Flashover with BA crews committed at T+20. Unsatisfactory command performance with critical safety or coordination lapses that require structured developmental intervention.

BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS

Situational Awareness: 70/100 - COMPETENT

- No explicit Level 3 anticipation recorded. Look ahead: verbalise predicted fire spread and future resource needs before escalation occurs.
- Limited Level 2 understanding evident. Translate observations into operational meaning (e.g. what dark pulsing smoke signifies for entry safety).
- Level 1 Perception active (2 situational observations recorded).
- All identified critical hazards had corresponding mitigating actions recorded.

Decision Making: 71/100 - COMPETENT

- Orders judged on their effect: 4 given — 2 sound, 1 wrong for the conditions, 1 not scored.
- Decision controls and cues are not captured from typed orders and are not scored.

Interpersonal Communication: 90/100 - EXEMPLARY

- Rapid, prompt acknowledgement to Fire Control.
- Response provided, but did not explicitly repeat back critical operational specifics.
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- Response provided, but did not explicitly repeat back critical operational specifics.
- Rapid, prompt acknowledgement to Pump Operator.
- Response provided, but did not explicitly repeat back critical operational specifics.
- Rapid, prompt acknowledgement to Police Sergeant 4421 (Met).
- Information from Police Sergeant 4421 (Met) was appropriately incorporated into commander's response.

Teamwork & Coordination: 50/100 - UNSATISFACTORY

- Tactical mode lag in Alfa: Mode changed to DEFENSIVE 5m ago, but crews remain committed inside and are NOT yet accounted for. Initiate emergency evacuation roll-call.

Leadership & Command Presence: 75/100 - COMPETENT

- Maintained clear command presence and tactical leadership.

Personal Resilience: 90/100 - EXEMPLARY

- Active monitoring intervals maintained without decision stagnation.
- Maintained safe span of control (1 sectors).

DECISION CONTROL PROCESS

4 decisions | 4 recognition-primed, 0 analytical | 0 decision controls completed | 0 stale

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

REACTIVE | 2 observations: level 1 perception 2, level 2 understanding 0, level 3 anticipation 0

- No explicit Level 3 anticipation recorded. Look ahead: verbalise predicted fire spread and future resource needs before escalation occurs.
- Limited Level 2 understanding evident. Translate observations into operational meaning (e.g. what dark pulsing smoke signifies for entry safety).
- Level 1 Perception active (2 situational observations recorded).

CORDON CONTROLS

60/100 | Not compliant | gateway not effective | 0 personnel unaccounted

- Inner cordon established (red/white barrier tape) securing operational hazard area.
- Safety warning: No scene access control point (SACP) established to log personnel entering the inner cordon.

IIMARCH BRIEFING

14/100 | Not passed

- + Information 100/100: Information articulated with 4 key operational term(s).
- Intent 0/100: Missing Intent.
- Method 0/100: Missing Method.
- Administration 0/100: Missing Administration.
- Risk Assessment 0/100: Missing Risk Assessment.
- Communications 0/100: Missing Communications.
- Humanitarian Issues 0/100: Missing Humanitarian Issues.
- Briefing lacks structure — ensure key sections (Information, Intent, Method, Risk) are clearly covered.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Intent.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Method.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Administration.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Risk Assessment.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Communications.
- Briefing omitted critical element: Humanitarian Issues.

SAFETY MAXIM

Fully compliant.

STRENGTHS

- Handled all dynamic roleplay injects and operational messages effectively.

LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES

- Safety-critical: Flashover with BA crews committed at T+20 — this overrides the marker average.
- Sector mode contradiction: Tactical mode lag in Alfa: Mode changed to DEFENSIVE 5m ago, but crews remain committed inside and are NOT yet accounted for. Initiate emergency evacuation roll-call.
- Safety warning: No scene access control point (SACP) established to log personnel entering the inner cordon.
- Operational briefing was unstructured — adopt the standard IIMARCH framework (Information, Intent, Method, Risk).

DECISION EVIDENCE

T+00 | SUPPORTED | monitor

"Perform a 360 and establish a water supply"

severity 80->85, smoke 65->73 Interpreter confidence: 30%.

T+05 | NOT SCORED | monitor

"Send a METHANE"

severity 85->89, smoke 73->79 Interpreter confidence: 30%.

T+10 | SUPPORTED | defensive-external

"External attack through upstairs window"

severity 89->87, smoke 79->74 Interpreter confidence: 50%.

T+15 | REVIEW | offensive-internal

"Leave perimeter as it is for now, establish an inner cordon and send in a BA crew to assess conditions"

severity 87->100, smoke 74->94 Interpreter confidence: 50%.

RADIO TRAFFIC RECEIVED

T+05 | PERSONS-REPORTED

Persons reported — neighbour states the occupier may still be inside, first floor.

T+05 | RESOURCE

Pump 2 in attendance — another crew and a further jet available.

T+05 | RESOURCE

Pump 3 in attendance — another crew and a further jet available.

T+05 | RESOURCE

Pump 4 in attendance — another crew and a further jet available.

T+05 | RESOURCE

PPV fan on scene with the second pump — positive pressure ventilation now available.

T+05 | RESOURCE

Aerial ladder platform in attendance — available as a water tower or for roof work.

T+10 | HAZARD

Pump operator to Incident Commander: the hydrant has failed — no pressure on the supply. We are on tank water only; the attack lines are losing pressure.

T+15 | INFO

Police Bronze to Fire Incident Commander: We have set a 50m cordon on Side Alpha. A crowd of approximately 40 onlookers is pressing forward on Side Bravo. Do you require us to extend the safety perimeter?

T+20 | SAFETY-WARNING

Safety Officer to Incident Commander: Mode changed to DEFENSIVE but crews remain inside Alfa sector. Immediate evacuation roll-call required!

FINAL FRAME - T+20 MIN

BA crews committed into a compartment that has flashed over — crews driven out, casualties likely.

ASSESSMENT STATUS

Simulator judgements in this pack are transparent training heuristics for instructor-led development. They are not a formal competence decision.

INSTRUCTOR / ASSESSOR NOTES

The Willows — Multiple viewpoint effects testing

INSTRUCTOR / ASSESSOR

DATE _____

PARTICIPANT / CREW

ROLE

DEBRIEF NOTES AND AGREED ACTIONS

INSTRUCTOR SIGNATURE

PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE